# ESXi Ransomware – A case study of Royal Ransomware

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## **Executive summary**


Royal ransomware joins other ransomware groups targeting ESXi servers. The malware powers off all virtual machines using the esxcli tool and doesn't encrypt a list of files that are embedded in the code. As in the case of the <u>Windows version</u>, a parameter called "-id" consisting of 32 characters must be specified in the command line.

The files are encrypted using the AES algorithm, with the key and IV being encrypted using the RSA public key that is hard-coded in the executable. The process can partially encrypt a file depending on its size and the value of the "-ep" parameter. The extension of the encrypted files is changed to ".royal\_u".

## **Analysis and findings**

SHA256: 06abc46d5dbd012b170c97d142c6b679183159197e9d3f6a76ba5e5abf999725

The ransomware retrieves the command line arguments and compares them with "-id", "-ep", "-stopvm", "-vmonly", "-fork", and "-logs":



#### Figure 1

The "-id" parameter consisting of 32 characters is mandatory; otherwise, the following message

is displayed:

🚺 🛃 🖼						
.text:00000000040A9B6 .text:00000000040A9BB .text:00000000040A9C0 .text:00000000040A9C5	call mov	edi, offset s _puts eax, 0 loc_40AB72	; "-id:	id must	be 32	characters"

#### Figure 2

The "-ep" parameter represents the encryption percentage of the files. It is converted from string to integer using the atoi function, as shown in figure 3.




Figure 3

When running with the "-stopvm" parameter, the process calls a function named stop\_vm. It creates a child process via a call to fork (see figure 4).


	_ZL7stop_vmv proc near
.text:00000000040A199	
.text:000000000040A199	var_5D0= byte ptr -5D0h
.text:00000000040A199	dest= byte ptr -1D0h
.text:000000000040A199	s= byte ptr -0D0h
.text:000000000040A199	size= gword ptr -0A0h
.text:000000000040A199	var 38= dword ptr -38h
.text:00000000040A199	_
.text:00000000040A199	
	haystack= gword ptr -28h
	var 20= gword ptr -20h
	var 14= dword ptr -14h
.text:000000000040A199	_
	;unwind { //gxx_personality_v0
.text:00000000040A199	
.text:00000000040A19A	-F, -F
.text:00000000040A19D	
.text:00000000040A19E	
.text:000000000040A1A5	call _fork
.text:00000000040A1AA	mov [rbp+var_38], eax
.text:00000000040A1AD	<pre>cmp [rbp+var_38], 0</pre>
.text:00000000040A1B1	jnz short loc_40A1E1

The child process obtains a list of running virtual machines, which are identified by World ID and Display Name. It saves it in a file called "list":

🛄 🚄 🖼	
.text:00000000040A1B3 mov	r8d, 0
.text:000000000040A1B9 mov	<pre>ecx, offset aEsxcliVmProces ; "esxcli vm process list &gt; list"</pre>
.text:000000000040A1BE mov	edx, offset aC ; "-c"
.text:000000000040A1C3 mov	esi, offset arg ; "/bin/sh"
.text:000000000040A1C8 mov	edi, offset arg ; "/bin/sh"
.text:000000000040A1CD mov	eax, 0
.text:000000000040A1D2 call	_execlp
.text:000000000040A1D7 mov	edi, 0 ; status
.text:00000000040A1DC call	_exit

#### Figure 5

The parent process opens the "list" file and gets the file status using the stat method, as displayed below.





The above file's content is read using a function called read\_all, which is a wrapper for the read method:

🚺 🚄 🖼		
.text:00000000040A27D		3212
.text:00000000040A27D	loc_40A2	27D:
.text:00000000040A27D	mov	<pre>rax, [rbp+size]</pre>
.text:00000000040A284	mov	<pre>rdx, rax ; unsignedint64</pre>
.text:00000000040A287	mov	<pre>rcx, [rbp+ptr]</pre>
.text:00000000040A28B	mov	eax, [rbp+fd]
.text:00000000040A28E	mov	<pre>rsi, rcx ; unsignedint8 *</pre>
.text:00000000040A291	mov	edi, eax ; int
.text:00000000040A293	call	_Z8read_alliPhm ; read_all(int,uchar *,ulong)
.text:00000000040A298	xor	eax, 1
.text:00000000040A29B	test	al, al
.text:00000000040A29D	jz	short loc_40A2BA








All virtual machines are powered off based on the World ID by spawning a new process:

.text:00000000040A3D1
.text:00000000040A3D1 loc_40A3D1:
.text:00000000040A3D1 mov rax, [rbp+haystack]
.text:00000000040A3D5 mov esi, offset aWorldId ; "World ID: "
.text:00000000040A3DA mov rdi, rax ; haystack
.text:0000000040A3DD call _strstr
.text:00000000040A3E2 mov [rbp+haystack], rax
.text:00000000040A3E6 cmp [rbp+haystack], 0
.text:00000000040A3EB setnz al
.text:00000000040A3EE test al, al
.text:00000000040A3F0 jnz loc_40A2EB

Figure 9






If the malware is running with the "-vmonly" parameter, then no files are encrypted, and the execution flow isn't impacted.

Whether the "-logs" parameter is specified, multiple logs are displayed in the standard output:

🚄 🖼		
ext:000000000040A9	63	
ext:00000000040A9	63 loc_40A	
ext:000000000040A9	63 mov	eax, [rbp+var_24]
ext:000000000040A9	66 cdqe	
ext:000000000040A9		rax, 3
ext:000000000040A9		rax, [rbp+var_90]
ext:000000000040A9		rax, [rax]
ext:000000000040A9		esi, offset aLogs ; "-logs"
ext:000000000040A9		rdi, rax ; this
ext:00000000040A9		_strcmp
ext:000000000040A9		eax, eax
ext:000000000040A9	85 jnz	short loc_40A98C
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	🛄 🚄 🖼	
[rbp+var_25], 1		
	.text:00	Figure 11 _ZN4logs4initEv ; logs::init(void
.text:000000000	.text:00	<pre>page000000040A987 call _ZN4logs4initEv ; logs::init(void Figure ]] int64fastcall logs::init(logs *_hidden this)</pre>
.text:000000000	.text:00	Figure ]] int64fastcall logs::init(logs *hidden this)
.text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:0000000000	.text:00 40C62E ; 40C62E pu 40C62E _Z	Figure 11 int64fastcall logs::init(logs *_hidden this) blic _ZN4logs4initEv ZN4logs4initEv proc near
.text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:0000000000 .text:0000000000	40C62E ; 40C62E ; 40C62E pu 40C62E _Z 40C62E ;	Figure 11 int64fastcall logs::init(logs *hidden this) ublic _ZN4logs4initEv ZN4logs4initEv ZN4logs4initEv proc near unwind { //gxx_personality_v0
.text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:0000000000	040C62E ; 040C62E ; 040C62E pu 040C62E _2 040C62E ; 040C62E ;	Figure 11 int64fastcall logs::init(logs *hidden this) Julic _ZN4logs4initEv ZN4logs4initEv proc near unwind { //gxx_personality_v0 Jush rbp
.text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:0000000000 .text:0000000000	040C62E ; 040C62E ; 040C62E pu 040C62E _2 040C62E ; 040C62E ;	Figure T 
.text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:0000000000	440C62E ; 440C62E ; 440C62E pu 440C62E z 440C62E ; 440C62E pu 440C62E pu	Figure 11 int64fastcall logs::init(logs *hidden this) blic _ZN4logs4initEv ZN4logs4initEv proc near unwind { //gxx_personality_v0 ush rbp ov rbp, rsp ov rax, cs:stdout@@GLIBC_2_2_5
.text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:0000000000	440C62E ; 440C62E pu 440C62E pu 440C62E ; 440C62E pu 440C62E pu 440C62E pu 440C62E pu 440C62E pu	Figure 11 int64fastcall logs::init(logs *_hidden this) bblic _ZN4logs4initEv ZN4logs4initEv proc near unwind { //gxx_personality_v0 ush rbp pov rbp, rsp pov rax, cs:stdout@GLIBC_2_2_5
.text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:0000000000 .text:0000000000 .text:00000000000	.text:00 040C62E ; 040C62E pu 040C62E ; 040C62E ; 040C62E pu 040C62F mu 040C63P mu 040C639 mu	Figure 11 int64fastcall logs::init(logs *hidden this) //gxx_personality_v0 /_gxx_personality_v0 /_gxx_personality_v0 /_gxx_personal
.text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:0000000000 .text:0000000000	.text:00 0400C62E ; 0400C62E pu 0400C62E pu 0400C62E pu 0400C62F mc 0400C62F mc 0400C632 mc 0400C632 mc	Figure 11 int64fastcall logs::init(logs *hidden this) ublic _ZN4logs4initEv ZN4logs4initEv proc near unwind { //gxx_personality_v0 ush rbp pv rbp, rsp pv rax, cs:stdout@GLIBC_2_2_5 pv cs:_ZL3log, rax ; log eave
.text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000	040C62E ; 040C62E pu 040C62E pu 040C62E pu 040C62E pu 040C62E pu 040C632 mc 040C639 mc 040C639 mc 040C630 l re 040C640 l re 040C641 ;	Figure 11 int64fastcall logs::init(logs *hidden this) bblic _ZN4logs4initEv ZN4logs4initEv proc near unwind { //gxx_personality_v0 ush rbp pov rbp, rsp pov rax, cs:stdout@@GLIBC_2_2_5 pov cs:_ZL3log, rax ; log eave etn } // starts at 40C62E
.text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000 .text:000000000	040C62E ; 040C62E pu 040C62E pu 040C62E pu 040C62E pu 040C62E pu 040C632 mc 040C639 mc 040C639 mc 040C630 l re 040C640 l re 040C641 ;	Figure 11 int64fastcall logs::init(logs *hidden this) wblic _ZN4logs4initEv ZN4logs4initEv proc near unwind { //gxx_personality_v0 ush rbp pv rbp, rsp pv rax, cs:stdout@@GLIBC_2_2_5 pv cs:_ZL3log, rax ; log tave etn

#### Figure 12

In the case of running with the "-fork" parameter, the executable creates a child process and performs a function call to setsid:



The first parameter should be a directory that will be encrypted. The <u>Windows version</u> of the ransomware uses the "-path" parameter in order to encrypt a target directory. The malware calls a function called search\_files with the targeted path as the first parameter (figure 14).

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.text:00000000040AA3A	
.text:00000000040AA3A	loc_40AA3A:
.text:00000000040AA3A	mov eax, dword ptr [rbp+var_34]
.text:00000000040AA3D	
.text:00000000040AA3F	
.text:00000000040AA44	and free free free
.text:00000000040AA48	
.text:00000000040AA4B	
.text:00000000040AA50	
.text:00000000040AA54	and free free free free free free free fre
.text:000000000040AA58 .text:000000000040AA5C	and the first set
.text:00000000040AA5C	
.text:000000000040AA62	
.text:000000000040AA62	
.text:00000000040AA62	_
.text:00000000040AA67	
.text:00000000040AA6B	
.text:00000000040AA70	mov rdi, rax
.text:00000000040AA73	; try {
.text:00000000040AA73	<pre>call _Z12search_filesSsb ; search_files(std::string,bool)</pre>
.text:00000000040AA73	; } // starts at 40AA73
.text:00000000040AA78	jmp short loc_40AA93

#### Figure 14

The process retrieves the number of processors using the sysconf method:



Royal ransomware creates 8 \* number of processors threads by calling the pthread\_create function (see figure 16).




Figure 16

The opendir function is utilized to open the target directory:



	; search_files(std::string, bool)
	<pre>public _Z12search_filesSsb</pre>
.text:00000000040A40F	_Z12search_filesSsb proc near
.text:00000000040A40F	N. 201
.text:00000000040A40F	var_8C= byte ptr -8Ch
.text:00000000040A40F	var_88= qword ptr -88h
.text:00000000040A40F	var_80= byte ptr -80h
.text:00000000040A40F	var_70= byte ptr -70h
.text:00000000040A40F	var_60= byte ptr -60h
.text:00000000040A40F	
.text:00000000040A40F	
.text:00000000040A40F	var_30= byte ptr -30h
.text:00000000040A40F	dirp= qword ptr -20h
.text:00000000040A40F	var_18= qword ptr -18h
.text:00000000040A40F	
.text:00000000040A40F	<pre>;unwind { //gxx_personality_v0</pre>
.text:00000000040A40F	push rbp
.text:00000000040A410	mov rbp, rsp
.text:00000000040A413	push r12
.text:00000000040A415	push rbx
.text:00000000040A416	add rsp, 0FFFFFFFFFFF80h
.text:00000000040A41A	mov [rbp+var_88], rdi
.text:00000000040A421	mov eax, esi
.text:00000000040A423	<pre>mov [rbp+var_8C], al</pre>
.text:00000000040A429	mov [rbp+dirp], 0
.text:00000000040A431	mov [rbp+var_18], 0
.text:00000000040A439	mov rax, [rbp+var_88]
.text:00000000040A440	mov rdi, rax ; this
.text:00000000040A443	<pre>callZNKSs5c_strEv ; std::string::c_str(void)</pre>
.text:00000000040A448	mov rdi, rax ; name
.text:00000000040A44B	
.text:00000000040A450	mov [rbp+dirp], rax

Figure 17

A ransom note called "readme" is created in the traversed directory. The "-id" parameter is also included in the text:

.text:000000000040A0E4 ; drop	anaramata(stduistaina)
.text:000000000040A0E4 ; drop	
.text:000000000040A0E4 _21150	rop_rensembotess proc near
.text:000000000040A0E4 var 28	and the 20th
.text:000000000040A0E4 var_20	
.text:000000000040A0E4 stream	* dword btr -isu
.text:00000000040A0E4	
.text:000000000040A0E4 ;	wind {//gxx_personality_v0
.text:000000000040A0E4 push .text:000000000040A0E5 mov	rbp
	rbp, rsp
.text:00000000040A0E8 push	r12 rbx
.text:00000000040A0EA push	
.text:00000000040A0EB sub	rsp, 20h
.text:000000000040A0EF mov	[rbp+var_28], rdi
.text:00000000040A0F3 lea	rax, [rbp+var_20]
.text:00000000040A0F7 mov	rcx, [rbp+var_28]
.text:000000000040A0FB mov	edx, offset aReadme ; "/readme"
.text:00000000040A100 mov .text:000000000040A103 mov	rsi, rcx
	rdi, rax ; this
.text:00000000040A106 call	_ZStplIcStilcHar_traitsIcESaIcEESbIT_T0_T1_ERKS6_PKS3_ ; std::operator+ <char,std::char_traits<char>,std::allocator<char>&gt;(std:</char></char,std::char_traits<char>
.text:00000000040A108 lea	rax, [rbp+var_20]
.text:00000000040A10F mov	rdi, rax ; this
.text:00000000040A112 ; try	
.text:000000000040A112 call	ZNKSsSc_strEv ; std::string::c_str(void)
.text:00000000040A117 mov	esi, offset modes ; "w+" rdi. rax : filename
.text:000000000040A11C mov .text:000000000040A11F call	rdi, rax ; filename fopen
.text:00000000040A124 mov	[rbp+stream], rax
.text:000000000040A128 cmp	[rbp+stream], 0
.text:00000000040A12D jz	short loc_40A184
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	.text:00000000040A12F mov edi, offset g id ; this
	.text:00000000040A134 call
	.text:00000000040A139 mov rdx, rax
	.text:00000000040A13C mov rcx, cs:g ransom note
	.text:00000000040A143 mov rax, [rbp+stream]
	.text:00000000040A147 mov rsi, rcx ; format
	.text:00000000040A14A mov rdi, rax ; stream
	.text:00000000040A14D mov eax. 0
	.text:000000000040A152 call fprintf



The malware reads the directory by calling the readdir method, as shown below:




#### Figure 19

The file type is compared with 0x4 (DT\_DIR) and 0x8 (DT\_REG):

🔜 🖆 🖼					
.text:00000000040A4ED mov	<pre>rax, [rbp+var_18]</pre>				
.text:000000000040A4F1 movzx	eax, byte ptr [rax+18]				
.text:00000000040A4F5 cmp	al, 4				
.text:000000000040A4F7 jnz	loc_40A5A0				
				•	
			🚺 🛃 🖼		
			.text:00000000040A5A0		1.00
			.text:00000000040A5A0	loc 40A	45A0:
		I	.text:00000000040A5A0	mov	rax, [rbp+var 18]
		I	.text:00000000040A5A4	movzx	eax, byte ptr [rax+18]
			.text:00000000040A5A8	cmp	al, 8
			.text:00000000040A5AA	jnz	loc_40A775

Figure 20

In the case of directories, the search\_files function is called recursively. For regular files, the ransomware avoids files containing the following strings: ".royal\_u", ".royal\_w", ".sf", ".v00", ".b00", "royal\_log\_", and "readme" (see figure 21).





The malicious process imports a hard-coded RSA public key:

.text:00000000040B641	; void *thread_func(void *)
.text:000000000408641	public _Z11thread_funcPv
.text:000000000040B641	Z11thread funcPv proc near
.text:00000000040B641	
.text:00000000040B641	var 68= gword ptr -68h
.text:00000000040B641	var 58= gword ptr -58h
.text:00000000040B641	var 50= byte ptr -50h
.text:00000000040B641	var 40= byte ptr -40h
.text:00000000040B641	
.text:00000000040B641	var 28= gword ptr -28h
.text:00000000040B641	var 20= gword ptr -20h
.text:00000000040B641	fd= dword ptr -18h
.text:00000000040B641	var 11= byte ptr -11h
.text:000000000040B641	
.text:00000000040B641	; unwind { // gxx personality v0
.text:00000000040B641	push rbp
.text:00000000040B642	mov rbp, rsp
.text:00000000040B645	push r12
.text:00000000040B647	push rbx
.text:00000000040B648	sub rsp, 60h
.text:00000000040B64C	mov [rbp+var_68], rdi
.text:00000000040B650	
.text:00000000040B655	

#### Figure 22

The RSA public key is read by calling the PEM\_read\_bio\_RSAPublicKey function (figure 24).

.text:0000	000000040AC60	push	rbp
.text:0000	000000040AC61		rbp, rsp
.text:0000	000000040AC64	sub	rsp, 30h
.text:0000	000000040AC68	mov	[rbp+s], rdi
.text:0000	000000040AC6C	call	BIO_s_mem
.text:0000	000000040AC71	mov	rdi, rax
.text:0000	000000040AC74	call	BIO_new
.text:0000	000000040AC79	mov	[rbp+var_18], rax
.text:0000	000000040AC7D	cmp	[rbp+var_18], 0
.text:0000	000000040AC82	jnz	short loc_40AC8B
	-		
C84 mov	eax, 0		.text:0000000040AC8B
C89 jmp	short locre	t_40ACDB	-
			text:00000000040AC8B mov rax, [rbp+s]
			.text:00000000040AC8F mov rdi, rax ; s
			.text:00000000040AC92 callstrlen
			.text:00000000040AC97 mov edx, eax
			.text:00000000040AC99 mov rcx, [rbp+s]
			.text:00000000040AC9D mov rax, [rbp+var_18]
			.text:00000000040ACA1 mov rsi, rcx
			.text:00000000040ACA4 mov rdi, rax
			.text:00000000040ACA7 call BIO_write
			.text:00000000040ACAC mov rax, [rbp+var_18]
			.text:00000000040ACB0 mov ecx, 0
			.text:00000000040ACB5 mov edx, 0
			.text:00000000040ACBA mov esi, 0
			.text:000000000040ACBF mov rdi, rax
			.text:000000000040ACC2 call PEM_read_bio_RSAPublic

Figure 24

Each of the created threads receives a file to be encrypted as a parameter:

🗾 🚄 🖼	
.text:00000000040B6C9	
.text:00000000040B6C9	loc_40B6C9:
.text:00000000040B6C9	<pre>lea rax, [rbp+var_50]</pre>
.text:00000000040B6CD	mov rdi, rax ; this
.text:00000000040B6D0	<pre>call ZN10threadpool3popEv ; threadpool::pop(void)</pre>
.text:00000000040B6D5	mov edi, offset mutex ; mutex
.text:00000000040B6DA	call _pthread_mutex_unlock
.text:00000000040B6DF	<pre>lea rax, [rbp+var_50]</pre>
.text:00000000040B6E3	mov rdi, rax ; this
.text:00000000040B6E6	; try {
.text:00000000040B6E6	<pre>call _ZNKSs6lengthEv ; std::string::length(void)</pre>

Figure 25

The ransomware calls a function named prepare\_file for all files to be encrypted, as highlighted in figure 26.

📕 🛃 🖼	
.text:00000000040B6FF	
.text:00000000040B6FF	loc_40B6FF:
.text:00000000040B6FF	mov [rbp+var_58], 0
.text:00000000040B707	<pre>lea rdx, [rbp+var_50]</pre>
.text:00000000040B70B	<pre>lea rax, [rbp+var_40]</pre>
.text:00000000040B70F	<pre>mov rsi, rdx ; std::string *</pre>
text:00000000040B712	mov rdi, rax ; this
.text:000000000040B715	call ZNSsC1ERKSs ; std::string::string(std::string const&
.text:00000000040B715	; } // starts at 40B6E6
.text:00000000040B71A	lea rdx, [rbp+var 58]
.text:00000000040B71E	<pre>lea rax, [rbp+var 40]</pre>
.text:000000000040B722	mov rsi, rdx
.text:00000000040B725	mov rdi, rax
.text:00000000040B728	; try {
.text:00000000040B728	<pre>call ZL12prepare fileSsPl ; prepare file(std::string,long *)</pre>

Figure 26

A file is opened for reading and writing via a function call to open (0x2 = **O\_RDWR**):

.text:00000000040AE28 lea .text:00000000040AE2F mov .text:00000000040AE3E mov .text:00000000040AE35 call .text:00000000040AE3A mov .text:00000000040AE3E test .text:00000000040AE3E test	rdx, [rbp+s] rsi, rdx ; stat_buf rdi, rax ; filename stat rax, [rbp+var_60] rax, rax short loc_40AE4A
-	
43 mov eax, 0FFFFFFFh	.text:00000000040AE4A
<pre>548 jmp short locret_40AE79</pre>	.text:00000000040AE4A loc_40AE4A:
	.text:00000000040AE4A mov rdx, [rbp+var_60]
	.text:00000000040AE4E mov rax, [rbp+var_A0]
	.text:00000000040AE55 mov [rax], rdx
	.text:00000000040AE58 mov rax, [rbp+var_98]
	.text:00000000040AE5F mov rdi, rax ; this
	.text:00000000040AE62 call
	.text:00000000040AE67 mov esi, 2 ; oflag
	.text:00000000040AE6C mov rdi, rax ; file
	.text:00000000040AE6F mov eax, 0
	.text:00000000040AE74 callopen

Figure 27

If the "-logs" parameter is specified, the process outputs a message containing the file to be encrypted:

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.text:00000000040B764	lea	rax, [rbp+var_50]
.text:00000000040B768	mov	rdi, rax ; this
.text:00000000040B76B	; try	{
.text:00000000040B76B	call	ZNKSs5c_strEv ; std::string::c_str(void)
.text:00000000040B770	mov	rsi, rax ; char *
.text:00000000040B773	mov	edi, offset aEncryptingS ; "Encrypting %s"
.text:00000000040B778	mov	eax, 0
.text:00000000040B77D	call	_ZN4logs5printEPKcz ; logs::print(char const*,)
.text:00000000040B782	mov	eax, cs:g_ep
.text:00000000040B788	movsxd	rcx, eax
.text:00000000040B78B		rdx, [rbp+var_58]
.text:00000000040B78F	mov	rsi, [rbp+var_20]
.text:00000000040B793	mov	rbx, [rbp+var_28]
.text:00000000040B797	mov	eax, [rbp+fd]
.text:00000000040B79A	mov	r8, rsi
.text:00000000040B79D	mov	rsi, rbx
.text:00000000040B7A0	mov	edi, eax
.text:00000000040B7A2	call	_ZL7encryptiP6rsa_stllPh ; encrypt(int,rsa_st *,long,long,uchar *)

The logging function implementation is shown in figure 29. It also displays the current date and time obtained using the current\_date\_time method.

In the second			
<pre>.text:00000000040C709 .text:00000000040C710 .text:00000000040C713 .text:00000000040C713 .text:00000000040C722 .text:00000000040C722 .text:00000000040C722 .text:00000000040C727</pre>	<pre>mov rdi call _ZL lea rax mov rdi ; try { call _Z</pre>	<pre>xx, [rbp+var_D0] li, rax Ll7current_date_timev ; current_date_time(vo xx, [rbp+var_D0] li, rax ; this ZNKSs5c_strEv ; std::string::c_str(void) kx, rax</pre>	id)
.text:00000000040C72A		x, cs:_ZL3log ; log	
.text:000000000040C731		i, offset aS_6 ; "[%s] "	
.text:00000000040C736		li, rax ; stream	
.text:000000000040C739			
.text:000000000040C73E		printf	
.text:000000000040C73E .text:000000000040C743		tarts at 40C722 mort loc 40C767	
	Jub 200	101 C 10C_40C/07	_
		L	
🗾 🛃 🖂			
.text:000000000044			
	3C767		. 1
		90767:	. t
.text:000000000044	C767 loc_40		
.text:00000000044	C767 loc_40	rax, [rbp+var_D0]	
.text:00000000044	0C767 loc_40 0C767 lea 0C76E mov		
.text:00000000044 .text:000000000044 .text:000000000044	0C767 loc_40 0C767 lea 0C76E mov 0C771 call	rax, [rbp+var_D0] rdi, rax       ; void *	
.text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044	0C767 loc_40 0C767 lea 0C76E mov 0C771 call 0C776 mov	<pre>rax, [rbp+var_D0] rdi, rax ; void * _ZNSsD1Ev ; std::string::~string()</pre>	
.text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044	00767 loc_400 00767 lea 0076E mov 00771 call 00776 mov 00770 lea	<pre>rax, [rbp+var_D0] rdi, rax ; void * _ZNSsD1Ev ; std::string::~string() rax, cs:_ZL3log ; log</pre>	
.text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:000000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044	0767 loc_400 0767 lea 076E mov 0771 call 0776 mov 0770 lea 0784 mov	<pre>rax, [rbp+var_D0] rdi, rax ; void *ZNSsDIEv ; std::string::~string() rax, cs:_ZL3log ; log rdx, [rbp+arg] ; arg</pre>	
.text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:000000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:000000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044	C767 loc_40 C767 lea C765 mov C771 call C776 mov C770 lea C770 lea C788 mov C788 mov	<pre>rax, [rbp+var_D0] rdi, rax ; void *ZNSsDlEv ; std::string::~string() rax, cs:_ZL3log ; log rdx, [rbp+arg] ; arg rcx, [rbp+format] rsi, rcx ; format rdi, rax ; s</pre>	
.text:0000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:000000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044	C767 loc_40 C767 lea C76E mov C771 call C776 mov C77D lea C77D lea C778 mov C788 mov C788 mov C785 mov	<pre>rax, [rbp+var_D0] rdi, rax ; void *ZNSsDIEv ; std::string::~string() rax, cs:_ZL3log ; log rdx, [rbp+arg] ; arg rcx, [rbp+format] rsi, rcx ; format rdi, rax ; svfprintf</pre>	
.text:00000000044 .text:000000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:000000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044	C767 loc_40 C767 lea C767 lea C766 mov C771 call C776 mov C770 lea C770 lea C784 mov C788 mov C788 mov C788 mov C788 mov C786 mov	<pre>rax, [rbp+var_D0] rdi, rax ; void *ZNSD1Ev ; std::string::~string() rax, cs:_ZL3log ; log rdx, [rbp+arg] ; arg rcx, [rbp+format] rsi, rcx ; format rdi, rax ; s _vfprintf rax, cs:_ZL3log ; log</pre>	1.
.text:0000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044	C767 loc_40 C767 lea C767 lea C767 mov C771 call C776 mov C770 lea C778 mov C788 mov C788 mov C788 mov C788 mov C788 call C791 call C796 mov	<pre>rax, [rbp+var_D0] rdi, rax ; void *ZNSsDlEv ; std::string::~string() rax, cs:_ZL3log ; log rdx, [rbp+arg] ; arg rcx, [rbp+format] rsi, rcx ; format rdi, rax ; s _vfprintf rax, cs:_ZL3log ; log rsi, rax ; stream</pre>	
.text:00000000044 .text:000000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:000000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044 .text:00000000044	C767 loc_40 C767 lea C767 lea C771 call C771 call C770 lea C770 lea C770 lea C778 mov C788 mov C788 mov C788 mov C789 call C799 mov C790 mov	<pre>rax, [rbp+var_D0] rdi, rax ; void *ZNSD1Ev ; std::string::~string() rax, cs:_ZL3log ; log rdx, [rbp+arg] ; arg rcx, [rbp+format] rsi, rcx ; format rdi, rax ; s _vfprintf rax, cs:_ZL3log ; log</pre>	.t .t

Figure 29

The malware generates 32 random bytes representing the AES key and 16 random bytes representing the IV:

.text:0000000004081C0 mov .text:0000000004081C6 mov .text:0000000004081C5 mov .text:0000000004081D mov .text:0000000004081D8 mov .text:0000000004081E1 ea .text:00000000004081E mov .text:0000000004081E mov	<pre>[rbp+fd], edi [rbp+var_3A0], rsi [rbp+var_3A8], rdx qword ptr [rbp+var_380], rcx [rbp+var_388], r8 rax, [rbp+src] esi, 32 ; unsignedint64 rdi, rax ; unsignedint8 *</pre>
.text:00000000040B1F1 call	_ZL10gen_randomPhm ; gen_random(uchar ",ulong)
.text:000000000040B1F6 xor .text:000000000040B1F9 test	eax, 1
.text:000000000040B1F9 test	al, al short loc 408207
.text:0000000004081FB j2	SHOPE 102-408207
	.text:00000000040B207
	.text:00000000040B207 loc_40B207:
	.text:00000000040B207 lea rax, [rbp+s]
	.text:00000000040B20B mov esi, 16 ; unsignedint64
	.text:00000000040B210 mov rdi, rax ; unsignedint8 *
	<pre>.text:00000000000000000000000 call _ZL10gen_randomPhm ; gen_random(uchar *,ulong)</pre>
	.text:00000000040B218 xor eax, 1
	.text:00000000040B21B test al, al
	.text:00000000040B21D jz short loc_40B229

Figure 30

The randomly generated bytes are encrypted using the RSA public key (see figure 31).

💵 🛃 🖼					
text:00000000040B229					
text:00000000040B229	loc_4082	229:			
text:00000000040B229	lea	rcx,	[rbp+src]		
text:00000000040B230	lea	rax,	[rbp+dest]		
text:00000000040B237	mov	edx,	20h ; ' '	;	n
text:00000000040B23C	mov	rsi,	rcx	;	src
text:00000000040B23F	mov	rdi,	rax	;	dest
text:00000000040B242	call	mem			
text:00000000040B247	lea	rax,	[rbp+s]		
text:00000000040B24B	lea	rdx,	[rbp+dest]		
text:00000000040B252	lea	rcx,	[rdx+20h]		
text:00000000040B256	mov	edx,	10h	;	n
text:00000000040B25B	mov	rsi,	rax	;	snc
text:00000000040B25E	mov	rdi,	rcx	;	dest
text:00000000040B261	call	_mem	сру		
text:00000000040B266	mov	rcx,	[rbp+var_3/	40	]
text:00000000040B26D	lea	rdx,	[rbp+dest]		
text:000000000040B274	lea	rax,	[rbp+dest]		
text:00000000040B27B	mov	r8d,	4		
text:00000000040B281	mov	rsi,	rax		
text:00000000040B284	mov	edi,	48		
text:00000000040B289	call	RSA_	public_encry	/pt	t
text:00000000040B28E	mov	[rbp-	+var_34], ea	ax	
text:00000000040B291	cmp	[rbp-	+var_34], 51	12	
text:00000000040B298	jz	short	t loc_40B2FE	3	


Figure 31

The malicious binary rounds up the file size to a multiple of 16, which is required by the AES algorithm:

🗾 🚄 🖼	
.text:00000000040B2FB	
.text:00000000040B2FB	loc_40B2FB:
.text:00000000040B2FB	mov rax, [rbp+var_3A8]
.text:00000000040B302	mov [rbp+var_58], rax
.text:00000000040B306	mov rax, [rbp+var_3A8]
.text:00000000040B30D	mov esi, 16
.text:00000000040B312	mov rdi, rax
.text:00000000040B315	<pre>call _Z9chROUNDUPILIET_S0_T0_ ; chROUNDUP<long,int>(long,int)</long,int></pre>
.text:00000000040B31A	mov [rbp+var_3A8], rax
.text:00000000040B321	mov rdx, [rbp+var_58]
.text:00000000040B325	mov eax, [rbp+fd]
.text:00000000040B32B	mov rsi, rdx ;int64
.text:00000000040B32E	mov edi, eax ; int
.text:00000000040B330	<pre>call _ZL11resize_fileil ; resize_file(int,long)</pre>
.text:00000000040B335	xor eax, 1
.text:00000000040B338	test al, al
.text:00000000040B33A	jz short loc_40B346

#### Figure 32

The entire file content is encrypted if the file length is less than or equal to 5,245,000 bytes or if the "-ep" parameter equals 100. As we've already described in our whitepaper about the <u>Windows version</u>, the ransomware can modify the encryption percentage and perform intermittent encryption:





The AES key is set for encryption by calling the AES\_set\_encrypt\_key function:

🗾 🚄 🖼			
.text:00000000040B3BF			
.text:00000000040B3BF	loc_4083	3BF:	
.text:00000000040B3BF	lea	rdx,	[rbp+var_190]
.text:00000000040B3C6	lea	rax,	[rbp+src]
.text:00000000040B3CD	mov	esi,	256
.text:00000000040B3D2	mov	rdi,	rax
.text:00000000040B3D5	call	AES_s	et_encrypt_key
.text:00000000040B3DA	mov	[rbp+	var_2C], 0
.text:00000000040B3E1	jmp	loc_4	ØB4FE

#### Figure 34

The file content is read by calling the read\_all function (figure 35).

🗾 🛃 🖼			
.text:00000000040B41E			
.text:00000000040B41E	loc_40B41E:	;	unsignedint64
.text:00000000040B41E	mov rdx,	[rbp+var_20]	
.text:00000000040B422	mov rcx,	[rbp+var_3B8]	
.text:00000000040B429	mov eax,	[rbp+fd]	
.text:00000000040B42F	mov rsi,	rcx ;	unsignedint8 *
.text:00000000040B432			int
.text:00000000040B434	call _Z8re	ead_alliPhm ;	<pre>read_all(int,uchar *,ulong)</pre>
.text:00000000040B439	xor eax,	1	
.text:00000000040B43C	test al, a	al	
.text:00000000040B43E	jnz loc_4	40B4D7	



The content is encrypted using the AES algorithm in CBC mode:

📕 🛃 🖼		
.text:000000000040B444	mov	rax, [rbp+var_28]
.text:00000000040B448	add	rax, [rbp+var_20]
.text:00000000040B44C	mov	[rbp+var_28], rax
.text:00000000040B450	lea	rsi, [rbp+s]
.text:00000000040B454	lea	rcx, [rbp+var_190]
.text:00000000040B45B	mov	rdx, [rbp+var_20]
.text:00000000040B45F	mov	rbx, [rbp+var_3B8]
.text:00000000040B466	mov	rax, [rbp+var_3B8]
.text:00000000040B46D	mov	r9d, 1
.text:00000000040B473	mov	r8, rsi
.text:00000000040B476	mov	rsi, rbx
.text:00000000040B479	mov	rdi, rax
.text:00000000040B47C	call	AES_cbc_encrypt
.text:00000000040B481	mov	rax, [rbp+var_20]
.text:00000000040B485	mov	rcx, rax
.text:00000000040B488	neg	rcx
.text:00000000040B48B	mov	eax, [rbp+fd]
.text:00000000040B491	mov	edx, 1 ; whence
.text:00000000040B496	mov	rsi, rcx ; offset
.text:00000000040B499	mov	edi, eax ; fd
.text:00000000040B49B	call	_lseek
.text:00000000040B4A0	mov	<pre>rdx, [rbp+var_20] ; unsignedint64</pre>
.text:00000000040B4A4	mov	<pre>rcx, [rbp+var_3B8]</pre>
.text:00000000040B4AB	mov	eax, [rbp+fd]
.text:00000000040B4B1	mov	rsi, rcx ; unsignedint8 *
.text:00000000040B4B4	mov	edi, eax ; int
.text:00000000040B4B6	call	_ZL9write_alliPhm ; write_all(int,uchar *,ulong
.text:00000000040B4BB	xor	eax, 1
.text:00000000040B4BE	test	al, al
.text:00000000040B4C0	jnz	short loc_40B4DA

Figure 36

The implementation of the AES\_encrypt function from OpenSSL is displayed in the figure below.

.text:00000000040DA60	public AES_encrypt
.text:00000000040DA60	AES_encrypt proc near
.text:00000000040DA60	
	var_70= dword ptr -70h
.text:00000000040DA60	var_60= dword ptr -60h
.text:00000000040DA60	var_50= qword ptr -50h
.text:00000000040DA60	var_48= qword ptr -48h
	var_40= qword ptr -40h
.text:00000000040DA60	var_34= dword ptr -34h
.text:00000000040DA60	
.text:00000000040DA60	;unwind {
.text:00000000040DA60	push r15
.text:00000000040DA62	lea r11, Te1
.text:00000000040DA69	lea r10, Te2
.text:00000000040DA70	push r14
.text:00000000040DA72	
.text:00000000040DA74	push r12
.text:00000000040DA76	lea r12, Te0
.text:00000000040DA7D	push rbp
.text:00000000040DA7E	lea rbp, Te3
.text:00000000040DA85	mov r14, r12
.text:00000000040DA88	push rbx
.text:00000000040DA89	mov r13, rbp
.text:00000000040DA8C	
.text:00000000040DA91	<pre>mov [rsp+30h+var_50], rsi</pre>
.text:00000000040DA96	movzx eax, byte ptr [rdi]
.text:00000000040DA99	movzx edx, byte ptr [rdi+3]
.text:00000000040DA9D	mov rcx, [rsp+30h+var_40]
.text:00000000040DAA2	movzx r9d, byte ptr [rdi+7]
.text:00000000040DAA7	
.text:00000000040DAAC	movzx esi, byte ptr [rdi+0Fh]
.text:00000000040DAB0	
.text:00000000040DAB3	xor r9d, [rcx+4]
.text:00000000040DAB7	xor r8d, [rcx+8]
.text:00000000040DABB	xor eax, edx
.text:00000000040DABD	
.text:00000000040DAC2	<pre>xor esi, [rcx+0Ch]</pre>
.text:00000000040DAC5	mov ebx, [rcx+0F0h]
.text:00000000040DACB	
.text:00000000040DACD	movzx edx, byte ptr [rdi+1]
.text:00000000040DAD1	
.text:00000000040DAD3	
.text:00000000040DAD6	
.text:00000000040DAD8	movzx edx, byte ptr [rdi+2]

Figure 37

The encrypted AES key and IV (512 bytes), followed by the file length (8 bytes) and the encryption percentage (8 bytes), are written to the encrypted file:




Figure 38

Finally, the extension of all encrypted files is changed to ".royal\_u":

🗾 🖆 🖼	A DATE THE AND	
.text:00000000040B7C4	lea rax, [rbp+var_30]	
.text:00000000040B7C8	<pre>lea rcx, [rbp+var_50]</pre>	
.text:00000000040B7CC	<pre>mov edx, offset aRoyalU_0 ; ".royal_u"</pre>	
.text:00000000040B7D1	mov rsi, rcx	
.text:00000000040B7D4	mov rdi, rax ; this	
.text:00000000040B7D7	<pre>call _ZStplIcSt11char_traitsIcESaIcEESbIT_T0_T1_ERKS6_PKS3_ ; std::operator+</pre>	
.text:00000000040B7D7	; } // starts at 408768	
.text:00000000040B7DC	<pre>lea rax, [rbp+var_30]</pre>	
.text:00000000040B7E0	mov rdi, rax ; this	
.text:00000000040B7E3	; try {	
.text:00000000040B7E3	<pre>callZNKSs5c_strEv ; std::string::c_str(void)</pre>	
.text:00000000040B7E8		
.text:00000000040B7EB		
.text:00000000040B7EF		
.text:00000000040B7F2		
	; } // starts at 40B7E3	
	mov rsi, rbx ; new	
	mov rdi, rax ; old	
.text:00000000040B7FD	call rename	

# Indicators of Compromise

## SHA256

06abc46d5dbd012b170c97d142c6b679183159197e9d3f6a76ba5e5abf999725

## **Royal Ransom Note**

readme

## **Processes spawned**

esxcli vm process list > list

esxcli vm process kill --type=hard --world-id=<World ID>

